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nature of man, which is the ultimate goal of studying the mind and mental 
states. He must consider though, that as attractive as finding one clear answer 
might be, the question of the nature of the mind might not be so simple. As 
Nagel so aptly puts it, “Philosophers share the general human weakness of 
explanations of what is incomprehensible in terms suited for what is familiar and 
well understood, though entirely different” (311). It is difficult for us to 
understand consciousness because it is so tied to subjective experience, which, 
by definition, cannot be understood in scientific terms. Although physical 
processes can help us understand mental states, they can only help us 
understand them to a point. Refusal to also acknowledge subjective experience 
yields an incomplete picture of the nature of the mind and mental states.
Armstrong acknowledges that science cannot tell us about God or 
morality or justice. Why then, should it be able to tell us about something as 
complex as consciousness, something that is so undeniably unique to every 
living thing that experiences it? In other words, the question of the nature of the 
mind may not have one simple truth. If the physicalist wants to employ scientific 
reason, he should ask a scientific question. Nagel and Jackson’s thought 
experiments do not deny that mental states cause behavior, and function to 
perform physical events. Rather, their experiments demonstrate that the human 
mind does more than this. Both experiments reveal the limitations of objective 
knowledge. If we are to gain a complete understanding of the nature of the 
mind, it is essential to look beyond science, and recognize that subjective 
experience cannot be separated from the mental state. Thus, physicalism can 
give neither a full account of the mind, nor an explanation of the true nature of 
man.
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! In this essay Sarah is careful to avoid a major pitfall of philosophy 
papers – an inadequate or burdensome summary – and instead takes multiple 
philosophical ideas to support an understanding and objection to the 
physicalist view of the mind. This paper is an exemplary model of a philosophy 
paper – summary, argument, counter-argument, conclusion – and incorporates 
each necessary aspect while presenting a clear and thorough understanding of 
the topics at hand. In incorporating summarized examples of both Nagel and 
Jackson’s arguments Sarah avoids a heavy handed summary and instead ties 
in her examples directly to the point she wishes to explore. This not only 
directs the reader to her purpose, but leaves the reader with a clear outline of 
where the paper is headed and how each philosopher’s arguments are taken 
into account in her objection. In analyzing the counter-argument to Jackson 
and Nagel,  Sarah gives adequate room to explain this point, yet leaves the 
reader with a clear sense of how this argument still presents dilemma’s to 
Jackson and Nagel. Overall, the essay is well balanced and incorporates a 
smooth underlying current along which the reader is drawn into the essay and 
gains a clear picture of both the objections and final conclusion Sarah makes.
-Tori Couch, Writing Center Consultant
